Carnap on Linguistic Framework (Part 3)

V. Limitation of the Framework

            The linguistic framework, which has been set up by Rudolf Carnap, is an excellent type of strategy he employed as a way of verifying the meaningfulness of the statement. But the nature of the framework is somehow defined, limited, and narrow. It is defined because he categorizes questions into two – internal and external. It is limited because it entertains questions to what particular language to be picked up and verified. It is also narrow because only those meaningful statements can be analyzed analytically and synthetically or empirically. Other statements that talk about non-empirically could not be verified by the framework, and they are treated as pseudo-questions and pseudo-debates.

A. Ayer and his Emotive Theory

Ayer, in his Language, Truth, and Logic, admits that not only meaningful statements through empirical observation could be verified. Ayer considers other language like ethical language or moral language as significant. This kind of language could not pass the verification principle of Carnap, for they are not objects of empirical matters. Ethical language is not literally significant within the linguistic framework of Carnap. For Carnap ethical language is considered pseudo-questions. Ayer instead proposed his emotive theory to justify ethical language as somehow significant. In what manner did Ayer justify his position?

            An example of ethical statement is “Stealing is wrong.” If this statement is going to be based on the internal questions of Carnap, it cannot find the answer, for the statement is neither analytic nor synthetic. It does not purport empirical fact. But Ayer has said that such ethical statement like “Stealing is wrong” functioned to express feelings or emotions. Only that such statement is not literally significant. The justification for such statement to be meaningful is this that ethical statement is emotive significance. Emotive significance is not the same as metaphysical significance. What is the peculiarity of emotive significance in order to become meaningful?

            The criterion is this: when an ethical statement evinces feelings on the part of the speaker and on the hearer. This possesses genuine emotive significance, only when some observable behavior occurs on the speaker and on the hearer.

B. Quine and his Two Dogmas of Empiricism

            Quine has made his attack on the understanding of analyticity first on Kant and Frege’s thoughts before Carnap’s. His attempt on sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic has separated himself from Carnap, his greatest teacher. There is no enough space here to expose how Quine’s argument has come about against Kant, Frege and Carnap. But it is very clear that, in general, Quine is not satisfied the way these philosophers explore on the meaning of analyticity.

            In his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, there are two things he did emphasize in relation to analyticity. He has commented that these philosophers did not achieve in creating boundary between analytic and synthetic. For him, it is a must neatly divided between those statements which are analytic and those statements which are synthetic or empirical. This is because for him, in doing so would be treated as unempirical dogma of empiricist. It would also become a metaphysic article of faith. But for Carnap, the combination of analytic-synthetic is very important in disposing any metaphysical questions and debates.

            The second part of his Quine’s writing is the idea of reductionism. The definition of the term holds that a meaningful statement could be translated to another statement on immediate experience. This means that reductionism does not parting ways from the original goal of the movement – Vienna Circle – that any knowledge should be based on sense-experience.

VI. Conclusion

            The thought of Rudolf Carnap is indeed a product of his brilliance as analytic philosopher. Any empiricist could be, at his own disposal and intelligence, immediately accept or reject statements which expresses cognitive significance. But he has come up with a language called linguistic framework which entertain questions that are internal and external, with logic or method and syntactical rules. And the highlight of having framework is the treatment of any metaphysical language as pseudo-problems.

            The repercussion to this initiative in rejecting metaphysical problem is also the rejection of ethical and moral language. The ethical language is anchored on metaphysics, and so with religious and aesthetic language. But thanks to Julius Ayer, with his emotive theory, he has rescued the reality of the world through the indispensable role of human behavior.

But the position of Ayer, like Rudolf Carnap, is somehow did not escape from being identified as solipsism. They posit that “If knowledge is based on sense-experience, then whose experience?” Prior to this, Ayer’s argument has to be proven whether the behavior being produced by certain action is a truly and literally cognitive in accordance to ethical language. And when affirmative answer is given to the question of solipsism, and then another repercussion may also occur, i.e. the answer becomes extreme subjectivism if without taking any precautionary measures.

But going back to the basic, why do Carnap put more premiums on sense-experience? Of course, the movement is assisting in the improvement of scientific procedures. In other words, Vienna Circle is at the service of science and not on metaphysical speculation.

Bibliography

Books

Hylton, Peter, Quine. New York and London: Routledge, 2007.

Martinich, A. P. and David Sosa ed. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy. USA and UK: Balckwell Publishers Inc., 2001.

Miller, Alexander. Philosophy of Language, 2^nd ed. New York and London: Routledge, 2007.

Stumpf, Samuel Enoch and James Fieser. A History of Philosophy: Socrates to Sartre and Beyond. 7^th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005.

Article

Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology of Rudolf Carnap

Electronic Source

Encarta Dictionaries 2007

Carnap on Linguistic Framework (Part 2)

III. Questions

            In order to explicate more on the kind of language, first is the need to understand the two questions being said to draw out the interest with verified answers. After this junction, we will return to the context of what is language all about in the mind of Carnap.

            Carnap speaks of two kinds of questions – either internal or external. This is crucial in getting into deeper clarification of linguistic framework. To make the distinction of the two simple, let me use the above example about the game like playing cards and the four friends. If one of them feels like not playing card, instead of basketball, then he could not be judged whether he is wise and skilled in playing cards. If he does, then judgment can be carried out. The first instance is a clear indication that the three are in the same boat, sharing the same language, while the second is not.

A. Internal Questions

Internal questions are matters that involved the verification whether it is right or wrong, as when the three of them shared the same interest of playing the game. In the internal question, to carry out the judgment if he is good in playing cards or not, if he is qualified to go the game or not, set of rules has to be employed as standard of the game. Thus we see in the demonstration that language and logic go together.

B. External Questions

External questions are matters that involved no verification of right and wrong. The situation is very lucid that not all of them share the same interest. No single language has been figured out. But if the person who is not one with the group’s interest, and begin to judge that playing card is not a good game to play instead of basketball, then certainly, the question of the rules and its language is out of the picture.

What is the criterion in choosing language? Carnap is very practical in his answer to the question. One has to make a choice. The choice of language has to be based on pragmatic consideration. Since Carnap is anti-metaphysical and empirical, no other language could be allowed than this.

IV. Linguistic Framework

What does it mean by language for Carnap? Remember that in every language, logic will always be its partner. Once language is being chosen, then that language has to be understood within a framework with set of rules called logic. If language is being compared by another language, it is considered as external question with the absence of being judged as right or wrong. But our concerned framework here could be welcomed and treated with only internal questions.

A. Types of Framework

Framework can be defined more or less that contains vocabulary with set of rules and conventions in governing the use of such vocabulary (Alexander Miller). What are these vocabulary and set of rules and conventions for? There are two frameworks given by Miller in his book Philosophy of Language to explain what does Carnap mean by it, and they are logical framework and factual framework.

Logical Framework

            The logical framework contains vocabulary such as numerals, variables, general terms and various conventions. The given example of internal question to this particular framework is, “Is 5 a prime number?” The given question could be judged according to the rules of language with its vocabulary. 5 is indeed a numeral, but this 5 could be replaced with a variable like X. The general term refers to the predicate part of the question – ‘is a prime number,’ but this general term could be judged with the various conventions like “5 is a prime number” is true if X can be replaced by 5.

Factual Framework

            The factual framework has the same content as that of logical like mass terms, general terms, and linguistic conventions. The given question here is, “Is lead soluble?” The term lead is the mass terms, and soluble is the general term. Now, the linguistic convention in this question is really to test whether lead is indeed soluble by dissolving that element with some liquid solution. Then, after the experiment, the question could be judged if it is true or false.

B. Logical and Factual differences

            As there are two types of frameworks that judges either the question is true or false verification, there are also two kinds of answers that yields.

The first framework is called logical because the nature of the answer is formulated a priori. The 5 in ‘5 is a prime number’ is coming from the subject of the sentence such that between 4 and 6, there is a prime number called 5. The answer to the internal question is called analytic. The second framework is called factual because there is, aside the available application of relevant convention, an appeal to be made to empirical evidence and observation. Like the question “Is lead soluble?” it has to undergo a process, an experiment in the laboratory, to prove whether lead is soluble or not. In short, the answer to the internal question depends on a posteriori matter.

A short scheme can be made out of the above. A linguistic framework that is logical admits an analytic answers, while factual framework admits of non-analytic answers or a posteriori answers. Logical framework is literally significant because the result emanates from the given subject in the proposition, while the factual framework is not literally significant because its result has to be verified empirically, like dissolving the lead with special solution to prove if it is indeed soluble or not.

C. Analytic and Synthetic Categories

            The above kinds of framework have shown from where it emanates its respective result – logical framework is a priori and factual framework is a posteriori. These frameworks have been understood by other philosophers as another extension to the internal and external questions. What is it? Logical framework, since it answers to the question analytically, belongs to the province of internal questions; while factual framework, since it answers to the question synthetically, belongs to the province of external questions. Miller’s explanation is that this kind of understanding of Carnap’s thought is misleading. These two categories could not be separated from different frameworks, but these two has to be taken as one within the province of one particular framework chosen.

            These two categories are the results coming from logical and factual frameworks. These truths are defined as: analytic truths are coming from the framework’s convention alone, while synthetic truths are those from the framework’s convention in the presence of empirical evidence. This is the character of the framework of Carnap’s being empiricist.

            A question can be posed here. Since the logical framework is plausible because it yields answers analytically, how about the factual framework on the possibility of knowledge that does not depend on sense-experience? Is it possible?

Carnap on Linguistic Framework (Part 1)

I. Introduction

The Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick, promulgated a set of doctrines called logical empiricism or logical positivism. This doctrine becomes the point of departure for most subsequent developments in the philosophy of science. Aside from this, the Vienna Circle rejects traditional metaphysics on the grounds that the data being discussed is not, by nature, empirical or sense-experience. Instead the movement accepts logicism, i.e. a theory that mathematics is logical, and focus on the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.

            Rudolf Carnap, a prominent member of the movement, is known to be anti-metaphysical and empiricist. He appears to be eliminating philosophical problems and debates especially on metaphysical problems and debates like the Platonists and the Nominalists did. He treats the subject matter as pseudo-problems and pseudo-debates. But he instead is trying to formulate philosophical doctrines through the use of linguistic conventionalism where there is a sharp distinction between internal questions and external questions instead of analytic and synthetic truths. This is the content of his seminal work Empiricism, Ontology and Semantics.

            The aim of this paper is first the exposition of Carnap’s thought on the necessity of language and logic in the formulation of authentic knowledge. Both of them are inseparable. In language’s existence, the role of logic is indispensable. The next part of the paper is the exposition on the internal questions and external questions. These two questions will help us determine which question is right and appropriate as the perspective in dealing with particular language. Carnap has put premium on the internal questions to yield a verifiable result according to the doctrine of the movement. The third part is the exposition of the two kinds of linguistic framework – logical and factual. Here is where the explication of logic is dealt with as the method and syntactical rules of each framework. The last part of the paper will be the evaluation why the idea of Carnap, in one way or another, has failed, with special mention of Ayer, Kant, Frege and Quine.

II. Language and Logic

The importance of language and logic has come about in his Principle of Tolerance. Language and logic play a constitutive role in knowledge. Thus any kind of knowledge is dependent on the choice of language and methods to be employed.

Language

Since Carnap is a member of the Vienna Circle, their fundamental doctrine is really anti-metaphysical and empiricist, holding that knowledge is based on sense-experience. Thus the kind of language they speak is no other than what is empirical. With this concern, Carnap has used the analogy of a game where four people are involved. If the three plans to play the same game while the other is not, then the four of them do not understand each other on what particular games they are interested. Thus there is no one single language that exists but of different kinds.

Logic

Logic, as explicated in his Logical Syntax of Language, refers to the rules. In every language chosen lays some rules to be followed whether it is right or wrong. When matters of choosing which language to use, Carnap says that one cannot determine with what is right and what is wrong. For him, the rules in every language serve as neutral court of appeal where everyone is treated fairly and equally. 

       Thus language and logic must go together. If a certain language has no logic, then there is no knowledge too. The kind of language and logic Carnap is referring here will be discussed on the third part of this paper.