V. Limitation of the Framework
The linguistic framework, which has been set up by Rudolf Carnap, is an excellent type of strategy he employed as a way of verifying the meaningfulness of the statement. But the nature of the framework is somehow defined, limited, and narrow. It is defined because he categorizes questions into two – internal and external. It is limited because it entertains questions to what particular language to be picked up and verified. It is also narrow because only those meaningful statements can be analyzed analytically and synthetically or empirically. Other statements that talk about non-empirically could not be verified by the framework, and they are treated as pseudo-questions and pseudo-debates.
A. Ayer and his Emotive Theory
Ayer, in his Language, Truth, and Logic, admits that not only meaningful statements through empirical observation could be verified. Ayer considers other language like ethical language or moral language as significant. This kind of language could not pass the verification principle of Carnap, for they are not objects of empirical matters. Ethical language is not literally significant within the linguistic framework of Carnap. For Carnap ethical language is considered pseudo-questions. Ayer instead proposed his emotive theory to justify ethical language as somehow significant. In what manner did Ayer justify his position?
An example of ethical statement is “Stealing is wrong.” If this statement is going to be based on the internal questions of Carnap, it cannot find the answer, for the statement is neither analytic nor synthetic. It does not purport empirical fact. But Ayer has said that such ethical statement like “Stealing is wrong” functioned to express feelings or emotions. Only that such statement is not literally significant. The justification for such statement to be meaningful is this that ethical statement is emotive significance. Emotive significance is not the same as metaphysical significance. What is the peculiarity of emotive significance in order to become meaningful?
The criterion is this: when an ethical statement evinces feelings on the part of the speaker and on the hearer. This possesses genuine emotive significance, only when some observable behavior occurs on the speaker and on the hearer.
B. Quine and his Two Dogmas of Empiricism
Quine has made his attack on the understanding of analyticity first on Kant and Frege’s thoughts before Carnap’s. His attempt on sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic has separated himself from Carnap, his greatest teacher. There is no enough space here to expose how Quine’s argument has come about against Kant, Frege and Carnap. But it is very clear that, in general, Quine is not satisfied the way these philosophers explore on the meaning of analyticity.
In his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, there are two things he did emphasize in relation to analyticity. He has commented that these philosophers did not achieve in creating boundary between analytic and synthetic. For him, it is a must neatly divided between those statements which are analytic and those statements which are synthetic or empirical. This is because for him, in doing so would be treated as unempirical dogma of empiricist. It would also become a metaphysic article of faith. But for Carnap, the combination of analytic-synthetic is very important in disposing any metaphysical questions and debates.
The second part of his Quine’s writing is the idea of reductionism. The definition of the term holds that a meaningful statement could be translated to another statement on immediate experience. This means that reductionism does not parting ways from the original goal of the movement – Vienna Circle – that any knowledge should be based on sense-experience.
VI. Conclusion
The thought of Rudolf Carnap is indeed a product of his brilliance as analytic philosopher. Any empiricist could be, at his own disposal and intelligence, immediately accept or reject statements which expresses cognitive significance. But he has come up with a language called linguistic framework which entertain questions that are internal and external, with logic or method and syntactical rules. And the highlight of having framework is the treatment of any metaphysical language as pseudo-problems.
The repercussion to this initiative in rejecting metaphysical problem is also the rejection of ethical and moral language. The ethical language is anchored on metaphysics, and so with religious and aesthetic language. But thanks to Julius Ayer, with his emotive theory, he has rescued the reality of the world through the indispensable role of human behavior.
But the position of Ayer, like Rudolf Carnap, is somehow did not escape from being identified as solipsism. They posit that “If knowledge is based on sense-experience, then whose experience?” Prior to this, Ayer’s argument has to be proven whether the behavior being produced by certain action is a truly and literally cognitive in accordance to ethical language. And when affirmative answer is given to the question of solipsism, and then another repercussion may also occur, i.e. the answer becomes extreme subjectivism if without taking any precautionary measures.
But going back to the basic, why do Carnap put more premiums on sense-experience? Of course, the movement is assisting in the improvement of scientific procedures. In other words, Vienna Circle is at the service of science and not on metaphysical speculation.
Bibliography
Books
Hylton, Peter, Quine. New York and London: Routledge, 2007.
Martinich, A. P. and David Sosa ed. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy. USA and UK: Balckwell Publishers Inc., 2001.
Miller, Alexander. Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge, 2007.
Stumpf, Samuel Enoch and James Fieser. A History of Philosophy: Socrates to Sartre and Beyond. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005.
Article
Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology of Rudolf Carnap
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