I. Introduction
The Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick, promulgated a set of doctrines called logical empiricism or logical positivism. This doctrine becomes the point of departure for most subsequent developments in the philosophy of science. Aside from this, the Vienna Circle rejects traditional metaphysics on the grounds that the data being discussed is not, by nature, empirical or sense-experience. Instead the movement accepts logicism, i.e. a theory that mathematics is logical, and focus on the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.
Rudolf Carnap, a prominent member of the movement, is known to be anti-metaphysical and empiricist. He appears to be eliminating philosophical problems and debates especially on metaphysical problems and debates like the Platonists and the Nominalists did. He treats the subject matter as pseudo-problems and pseudo-debates. But he instead is trying to formulate philosophical doctrines through the use of linguistic conventionalism where there is a sharp distinction between internal questions and external questions instead of analytic and synthetic truths. This is the content of his seminal work Empiricism, Ontology and Semantics.
The aim of this paper is first the exposition of Carnap’s thought on the necessity of language and logic in the formulation of authentic knowledge. Both of them are inseparable. In language’s existence, the role of logic is indispensable. The next part of the paper is the exposition on the internal questions and external questions. These two questions will help us determine which question is right and appropriate as the perspective in dealing with particular language. Carnap has put premium on the internal questions to yield a verifiable result according to the doctrine of the movement. The third part is the exposition of the two kinds of linguistic framework – logical and factual. Here is where the explication of logic is dealt with as the method and syntactical rules of each framework. The last part of the paper will be the evaluation why the idea of Carnap, in one way or another, has failed, with special mention of Ayer, Kant, Frege and Quine.
II. Language and Logic
The importance of language and logic has come about in his Principle of Tolerance. Language and logic play a constitutive role in knowledge. Thus any kind of knowledge is dependent on the choice of language and methods to be employed.
Language
Since Carnap is a member of the Vienna Circle, their fundamental doctrine is really anti-metaphysical and empiricist, holding that knowledge is based on sense-experience. Thus the kind of language they speak is no other than what is empirical. With this concern, Carnap has used the analogy of a game where four people are involved. If the three plans to play the same game while the other is not, then the four of them do not understand each other on what particular games they are interested. Thus there is no one single language that exists but of different kinds.
Logic
Logic, as explicated in his Logical Syntax of Language, refers to the rules. In every language chosen lays some rules to be followed whether it is right or wrong. When matters of choosing which language to use, Carnap says that one cannot determine with what is right and what is wrong. For him, the rules in every language serve as neutral court of appeal where everyone is treated fairly and equally.
Thus language and logic must go together. If a certain language has no logic, then there is no knowledge too. The kind of language and logic Carnap is referring here will be discussed on the third part of this paper.
